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Abstract
This paper presents a model of inflation in developing economies and
makes uses of it to evaluate macroeconomic policy in those countries. We
see cross-sectoral interactions between demand and supply side forces as
central and show that the standard macroeconomic policy recommenda-
tions of inflation targeting and balanced budgets (i) increase volatility by
amplifying external shocks and (ii) can lead to premature deindustrializa-
tion. The analysis applies to economies with marked underemployment, a
central feature of developing and emerging countries. The recent Brazilian
experience is used to illustrate the argument.
JEL codes: E63, O23, O14
Key words: inflation targeting, Dutch disease, overvaluation, com-
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1 Introduction
Why do economies with large amounts of hidden unemployment and under-
employment experience inflationary pressures? Standard economic theory re-
lates inflation to deviations of the actual unemployment rate from its ‘natural
rate’. But the notion that labor constraints and deviations from a natural rate
of unemployment generate inflation and limit economic growth in developing
countries would seem hard to defend.
Our analysis of inflation in dual economies has strong affinities with the
Latin American structuralist tradition. We see inflation as deriving from social
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conflict, inertia related to formal and informal indexation, and sectoral interac-
tions between demand and supply side forces.1 Incomes in the informal sector
are demand determined, shocks to aggregate demand influence relative incomes,
and shifts in relative incomes influence wage setting in the formal sectors of the
economy.
Relative wages have a strong normative element, and wage pressures develop
in the formal sectors as workers react to shocks and try to preserve ‘fair’ relative
wages. Wage inflation in the formal sectors does not, however, restore the
previous relative wages: nominal wage gains in the formal sectors raise incomes
in the informal sector pari passu, maintaining the relative incomes that were at
odds with prevailing social norms. Thus, in the absence of policy intervention
inflationary expectations may build up and lead to explosive inflation. Inflation-
targeting monetary policy can keep inflation at a desirable rate, but at the
expense of exchange rate appreciation and a shift in economic activities towards
nontradable sectors.
Wage norms and informal indexation are central to this process, but social
norms evolve endogenously, and this path dependency allows structural transfor-
mation and economic development. The gradual elimination of wage premia in
the formal sector and underemployment in the informal sector need not provoke
high inflation. Large shocks to relative incomes, by contrast, can be inflationary,
and if our argument is correct, the standard prescriptions for macroeconomic
policy are misguided.
The period from the early 1980s to the turn of the century saw the gradual
establishment of a hegemonic macroeconomic agenda of balanced government
budgets, inflation targeting and liberalized goods and capital markets. In the
European Union the prescriptions are enshrined in the Stability and Growth
Pact for fiscal policy and the explicit specification of the primary objective of the
ECB as maintaining price stability.2 But even when not part of an official set of
guidelines and objectives, these principles have guided policy in many countries
over the last 20-40 years, developed as well as developing. The most recent
OECD Survey on Brazil, for instance, is quite explicit. Following an assessment
of the current state of the economy, the survey outlines its main messages. The
first of these states that: “[s]tabilising public debt and ensuring that inflation
remains close to the target are key macroeconomic priorities” (OECD (2018),
p.12). The recommendations, repeated in widely distinct circumstances, have
1We use the term ‘dual economies’ to denote economies with pronounced differences be-
tween modern sectors and low-productivity informal sectors with significant amounts of un-
deremployment. Economies without significant sectoral differences of this kind are ‘mature’.
2The Stability and Growth Pact and its various updates are described on the European
Commission website, https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-
policy-coordination/eu-economic-governance-monitoring-prevention-correction/stability-and-
growth-pact enis . The objectives of the ECB’s monetary policy are set out on the bank’s
website:
“The primary objective of the ECB’s monetary policy is to maintain price stabil-
ity. This is the best contribution monetary policy can make to economic growth
and job creation.” https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/intro/html/index.en.html
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been echoed by national economic institutions and increasingly influence policy
making.3
Inflation targeting is often described as successful, despite challenges of im-
plementation in emerging and developing economies.4 Even when combined
with balanced budgets, however, inflation targeting has often failed to deliver
the anticipated improvements in real economic performance; Brito and Byst-
edt (2010), for instance, find evidence that inflation targeting decreased output
growth in emerging economies and did not reduce inflation and output volatil-
ity. This is no accident, we argue. A combination of balanced budgets and
inflation targeting can amplify fluctuations and lead to slow economic growth
and premature deindustrialization.5
The commodity boom of the early 2000s exemplifies the dangers of the policy
mix. Rising commodity prices relaxed both government-budget and balance-of-
payments constraints for many middle-income countries and allowed an expan-
sion of aggregate demand. Incipient inflationary pressures were addressed using
monetary policy, and the resulting appreciation of the exchange rate carried
additional short-term political benefits by increasing people’s real purchasing
power.6 The negative effects of the policy showed up later. An overvalued
exchange rate contributed to deindustrialization and a large expansion of the
nontradable sector. When the boom came to end, exchange rates depreciated,
inflation increased, and the economies went into recession with a less developed
productive structure. The macroeconomic policy prescriptions had contributed
to a classical Dutch disease.
The experiences of many Latin American countries fit this pattern. The com-
modity boom boosted their economies both directly and indirectly via increased
fiscal capacity (converted into higher public sector employment, cash transfers
and public investment) (IMF (2018)).7 The expansion was particularly strong
3The same recommendation to Brazilian policy makers had been made 13 years earlier:
“Of particular importance in the macro area are the inflation targeting frame-
work for monetary policymaking and the Fiscal Responsibility legislation”
(OECD (2005), p.13).
4According to Fraga, Goldfajn, and Minella (2003) (p. 2),
“The performance of inflation targeting regimes around the world has been pos-
itive. Average inflation in both emerging markets and developing economies
has come down after the adoption of the inflation targeting regime. However,
emerging market economies (EMEs) have had a relatively worse preformance.
(...) inflation targeting in these countries is a more challenging task than in
developed ones.”
5Rodrik (2016) applies the concept of premature industrialization to countries whose man-
ufacturing sector has declined at income levels much lower than those at which developed
countries began to deindustrialize - that is, the economies become specialized in (low-skill)
services before having undergone a profound experience of industrialization.
6In developing economies interest rates often influence inflation primarily through their
effects on the exchange rate. The Brazilian (1994-1999), Argentine (1991-2002) and Mexican
(1989-1994) price stabilization programs are illustrative (although extreme) cases of the use
of exchange rates to stop inflation.
7These developments were pronounced in Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina, Peru, Brazil,
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in the natural resource and nontradable sectors, notably commerce and con-
struction, while the manufacturing sector shrank from 16.4% in 2003 to 13.3%
in 2012.8 The Brazilian case, which is described in greater detail in section 3,
illustrates our argument. The region is not unique, however, and the analytical
framework in this paper has, we believe, wider applicability. Many developing
economies outside Latin America also have a high dependence on primary com-
modity exports - 102 countries were in this condition in the period 2013-2017
(UNCTAD (2019))9; Ghana, for instance, followed policies of sound finance and
inflation targeting and experienced a similar process of deindustrialization.
We do not suggest that the problems associated with overvalued exchange
rates have gone unrecognized.10 Many economists have warned of its dan-
gers, and the recognition is not confined to academics. What became known
as the ‘Washington consensus’ (Williamson (1990)) included competitive ex-
change rates as one of its ten policy prescriptions, although in a later discussion,
Williamson (2004) suggested that already by 1990, the consensus had shifted
away from seeing competitive exchange rates as a priority.11 IMF studies, in-
cluding Savastano, Masson, and Sharma (1997), have also pointed to potential
conflicts in developing countries between inflation targeting and a concern for
external competitiveness. The authors note that none of the standard models
of inflation “commands support comparable to that obtained by natural rate
models in industrial countries” (p. 31-32), and this and other problems make
them question “the adoption of a framework akin to IT” in developing countries
in the near term (p. 38). But despite these warnings and notes of caution, in-
flation targeting has been increasingly adopted, also by developing economies,
and exchange rate concerns have been largely ignored.
The fiscal dimension of the standard policy recommendations has also come
in for criticisms, many of which our analysis is in line with. Austerity policies –
often motivated by the alleged dangers of public debt – can do and have done
immense damage. European policies after the 2008 financial crisis is a case
in point, and fiscal consolidation in commodity exporters hurt the economies
when the boom came to an end and recession was already approaching. A focus
on balanced budgets effectively promotes a procyclical policy and exacerbates
macroeconomic instability with detrimental effects on long-term growth.
But stabilization is different from sustained fiscal stimulus. Some developed
Colombia and Paraguay.
8Latin America and Caribbean. World Bank data, available at:
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.MANF.ZS
9Mainly in Africa, Middle East, and East Asia (UNCTAD (2017))
10E.g. Krugman (1987), Ros and Skott (1998), Gala (2007) Rodrik (2008) and Razmi,
Rapetti, and Skott (2012).
11Williamson (2004) (p. 3):
I fear I indulged in wishful thinking in asserting that there was a consensus in
favor of ensuring that the exchange rate would be competitive, which essentially
implies an intermediate regime; in fact, Washington was already beginning to
edge towards the two corner doctrine, which holds that a country must either
fix firmly or else it must float ‘cleanly’.
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economies have faced severe structural aggregate demand problems (Japan is
a clear example), and a balanced budgets and inflation targeting policy im-
part a long term deflationary bias without full employment in those countries.
Developing economies, however, do not have structural aggregate demand prob-
lems, and expansionary aggregate demand policy is not a development strategy.
Abandoning balanced budgets in favor of more aggressive sustained fiscal ex-
pansion while complying with rigid monetary policies can aggravate the damage
and push these developing economies further in the direction of deindustrializa-
tion.12
To summarize, in this paper we present a model of inflation in dual economies.
Sectoral specificities and interactions between demand and supply side forces are
at the core of the model. If the inflation analysis is correct, second, we show
that a policy combination of balanced budgets and inflation targeting may derail
economic development.
A brief comment on methodology is relevant, we belive. Formal models
can help structure and clarify ideas and inform empirical studies. To be useful
they must simplify, and the model in this paper is no exception. Our modeling
approach, however, may be unfashionable: the absence of intertemporally op-
timizing representative agents may seem like a glaring deficiency. We make no
apologies for this. In our judgment the simplifications we have chosen provide
a much better starting point than DSGE models with intertemporal optimiza-
tion, rational expectations and fluctuations around a steady growth path with
a natural rate of unemployment - a framework that is particularly problematic
when applied to economies with pronounced sectoral differences and a need for
structural transformation.13
The rest of the paper is structured in four sections. Section 2 uses a four-
sector model of a dual economy model with conflict-driven inflation to examine
some implications of balanced budgets and inflation targeting policies. The
Brazilian case is outlined in Section 3 which also includes a discussion of dif-
ferences and similarities between our account and other inflation theories and
interpretations of Brazil’s experience. Section 4 offers a few concluding com-
ments and observations.
2 The model
2.1 Overview
The model includes four sectors: a commodity sector producing a pure export
good, two formal sectors, one producing a tradable and one producing a non-
tradable good, and an informal sector producing a nontradable good.
12A vast literature considers possible relations between industrialization, technological
change and economic development; see, e.g. Rodrik (2013), Haraguchi, Cheng, and Smeets
(2017) and Dosi and Nelson (2010).
13Our approach differs from some other alternatives to DSGE models, such as agent-based
models. We see our ’classical’ approach and agent-based models as potentially complementary;
one virtue of our analytical strategy, we believe, is the clarity of causal mechanisms.
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We use the term informal as a short-hand for activities with substantial
underemployment and low incomes. Most of these activities are informal in a
legal sense, but it is not the legal status, ‘formality’ per se, that is important;
the registration of street vendors would not change the reality of their situation.
The informal sector in middle income countries typically includes a myriad of
precarious urban activities, many of them in services. The sector is large in those
countries and has much lower productivity and average incomes than formal
sectors; summarizing ‘five facts about informality’, La Porta and Shleifer (2014)
find the evidence to be broadly consistent with the dual view of informality
associated with Lewis and classical development theory.
The output of the informal sector is nontradable, but a sizable part of non-
tradables, particularly in services and commerce, is produced by a formal sector.
The distinction between formal and informal nontradable sectors therefore can
be important.
2.2 Assumptions
2.2.1 Production and pricing
The formal sector is composed of two subsectors, a tradable and a nontrad-
able one. Both sectors use capital and labor. Capital stocks are given in the
short run and labor is the only variable input
M = FM (LM )
S = FS(LS)
M and S denote the output of tradable and nontradable goods; L is employment
with subscripts denoting the sector.
Nominal wages are predetermined in both formal sectors, and the marginal
product of labor and the markup are taken as constant in the benchmark version
of the model (these assumptions are relaxed in section 2.8). Thus, prices become
predetermined too, and changes in demand are met by quantity adjustments.
Normalizing labor productivities to one, we have
M = qMLM = LM (1)
S = qSLS = LS (2)
and
pM =
wM
(1− piM )qM =
wM
1− piM (3)
pS =
wS
(1− piS)qS =
wS
1− piS (4)
where pii denotes the profit share in sector i.
The resource sector produces a pure export good, which we shall refer
to as ‘commodities’; the output of this sector may include oil, minerals, or
specific agricultural goods. For simplicity it is assumed that no domestic inputs
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are involved in its production. This assumption is clearly extreme, but the
qualitative analysis is unaffected as long as export shocks have little effect on
the allocation of domestic inputs of labor and capital to this sector. In other
words, we are capturing the exogenous rents that characterize these activities.
The value of exports in foreign currency (Z) is exogenous.
The informal sector, finally, produces a non-tradable good and uses labor
as the only input. Workers that fail to find jobs in the formal sectors move to
the informal sector which is characterized by hidden unemployment and under-
employment. Thus, if N denotes the total labor force, we have
LA = N − LS − LM = (N − S −M) (5)
The average income in the informal sector is given by
wA =
pAA
LA
(6)
where A is output in the informal sector and pA its price level.
2.2.2 Demand
The two nontradable sectors produce pure consumption goods. The domesti-
cally produced tradable good, by contrast, can be used for either investment
or consumption. It is assumed that all investment goods are produced domes-
tically; results do not change qualitatively if this assumption is relaxed (see
section 2.8). Total investment is the sum of investment in both formal sectors
and is determined by their levels of output (corresponding to the utilization
rates of capital) and the real rate of interest (r),
I = I(M,S, r) (7)
All wages and informal sector incomes are spent on consumption while only
a portion (1 − s) of profits is consumed. The revenues from commodities go
partly to the government and partly to the private sector. We assume that a
portion  of the revenues is spent on public and private consumption and that
the state receives a fixed proportion of the revenues.
Algebraically, nominal private consumption (C) and government consump-
tion (G) are given by:
C = pAA+ (1− piS)pSS + piSpSS(1− s) + (1− piM )pMM
+ piMpMM(1− s) + (1− β)EZ (8)
G = βEZ (9)
where E is the nominal exchange rate and β the share of resource revenues
going to the state. For simplicity, we leave out taxation of incomes in the
non-resource sectors and assume that government spending is determined by
taxes and royalties from the resource sector; a balanced government budget is
obtained if  = 1 and a fiscal surplus if  < 1. Given the purposes of this paper,
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little would be gained by including taxes on wages and profits in the formal
sectors.14
Private and government consumption are split between four goods: two
nontradables (formal and informal) and two tradables (domestically produced
and imported). The benchmark version of the model assumes that each of the
four goods receives a fixed share of total domestic spending on consumption
(corresponding to a Cobb-Douglas utility function); the shares of the M,S and
A sectors are αM , αs, αA, leaving θ = (1 − αM − αS − αA) as the share for
imports. This demand specification is relaxed in section 2.8.
Net exports (NX) are equal to the sum of resource exports and net exports
of modern sector goods. Nominal imports are given as a share (θ) of domestic
nominal consumption; real exports of the tradable M -good (X) are determined
by foreign income and the international competitiveness of the domestic tradable
sector. The main determinant of competitiveness in the short run is the relative
price p∗ME/pM , and – normalizing the foreign currency price of imported goods
to one (p∗M = 1) and omitting foreign income as an explicit argument – we have
that
NX = pMX − Ep∗MIM + EZ
= pMX(η)− θ(C +G) + pMηZ; X ′ > 0
where
η =
Ep∗M
pM
=
E
pM
(10)
With a slight abuse of terminology, we shall refer to η as the real exchange rate.
2.3 Short run equilibrium
We have the following equilibrium conditions for the M,S and A sectors:15
pMM = αM (C +G) + pMI + pMX (11)
pSS = αS(C +G) (12)
pAA = αA(C +G) (13)
Using (8)-(9) and (11)-(13) aggregate domestic consumption – private and
government – can be written
C +G =
pM [(1− piMs)(I +X) + ηZ]
θ + s(αMpiM + αSpiS)
(14)
14Skott (2020) considers fiscal policy in more detail.
15The investment and export variables (I and X) are in real terms. With multiple con-
sumption goods, however, private and public consumption (C + G) are defined in nominal
terms.
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From equations (11)-(12) and (14) it follows that
M = αM
(1− piMs)[I(M,S, r) +X(η)] + ηZ
θ + s(αMpiM + αSpiS)
+ I(M,S, r) +X(η) (15)
S = αS
pM
pS
(1− piMs)[I(M,S, r) +X(η)] + ηZ
θ + s(αMpiM + αSpiS)
(16)
The short run solution defined by equations (15)-(16) is economically mean-
ingful if the Keynesian stability conditions are satisfied. The standard intu-
ition still applies for this two-sector system: stability requires investment to
be relatively insensitive to variations in output, now taking into account the
interactions between the two sectors (see Appendix A for details).
As shown in Appendix B, if M∗ and S∗ denote the short run equilibrium
solutions, we have
∂M∗
∂Z
> 0;
∂S∗
∂Z
> 0
∂M∗
∂η
> 0;
∂S∗
∂η
> 0
∂M∗
∂r
< 0;
∂S∗
∂r
< 0
Intuitively, an increase in commodity revenues stimulates consumption and
raises capacity utilization of both sectors. The benchmark specification of de-
mand ensures that a depreciation (a rise in η) would boost demand in the
tradable sector, with positive derived effects for nontradables. Analogously, an
increase in interest rates would have its direct effect (in this case negative) on
investment and the demand for tradables, with derived effects for nontradables.
Aggregate income in the informal sector can be determined by (13)-(14) or
alternatively, using (12)-(13), by noting that
pAA =
αA
αS
pSS (17)
The effects of a commodity boom on net exports are ambiguous without
restrictions on the various parameters. We have,
∂NX
∂Z
R 0, ∂NX
∂η
R 0, ∂NX
∂r
> 0
A shock to commodity revenues has a direct impact on domestic consumption
with derived effects on investment, domestic saving and imports. The effect on
net exports can become negative if the consumption rate out of the commodity
revenue is high ( is large), the import propensity out of consumption is large (θ
is large) and the sensitivity of accumulation to changes in output is sufficiently
high (see Appendix B). The derived effects on imports may also dominate the
positive effects of a depreciation on total exports (on X(η)+ηZ), and the effects
of a depreciation on the trade balance are ambiguous.
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2.4 Wage setting and inflation
The levels of money wages in the formal sectors are predetermined in the short
run. But the average income in the informal sector is endogenous, and the rates
of wage inflation in the formal sectors cannot be taken as constant.
Combining equations (5)-(6) and (16)-(17), the average income in the infor-
mal sector is given by
wA =
pAA
N − LM − LS =
αA(C +G)
N − LM − LS
=
αA
N −M − S
pM [(1− piMs)(I +X) + ηZ]
θ + s(αMpiM + αSpiS)
(18)
Changes in informal sector incomes need not affect the prices of informal goods:
a rise in demand for informal goods can raise the price pA, or it can reduce
the rate of underemployment and raise the level of output A; of course, it can
also be some combination of the two. Given the Cobb-Douglas specification
of the composition of consumption demand, however, the effects on average
incomes in the informal sector are independent of changes in pA. Thus, even if
prices of informal goods stay constant, an increase in informal-sector incomes
has repercussions for wage inflation in the formal sectors if workers in these
sectors react by pushing to increase their income.
The notion that norms of fairness influence wage setting has a long history
in economics. Keynes (1936) famously explained wage stickiness by workers’
resistance to wage cuts that could reduce their relative wages, and Akerlof and
Yellen (1990) pointed to wage norms as the source of unemployment among low-
wage workers. Experimental and real-world evidence confirms the significance
of notions of fairness for wage and price setting (e.g. Kahneman, Knetsch, and
Thaler (1986), Bewley (1998)).
Our benchmark specification of wage inflation in the formal sector embodies
relative-wage norms: increases in informal-sector incomes generate cost-push
pressures on wages in the formal sector. Formally, we assume that
wˆM = φM (
wfM
wM
) + pˆe; φM (1) = 0, φ
′
M > 0 (19)
wˆS = φS(
wfS
wS
) + pˆe; φS(1) = 0, φ
′
S > 0 (20)
where pˆe is the expected inflation rate. The ‘fair wages’ wfM and w
f
S are deter-
mined by the average incomes and wages in other sectors, that is
wfM = f
M (wA, wS) (21)
wfS = f
S(wA, wM ) (22)
With a fixed markup, wage inflation maps directly into price inflation. Suc-
cessful inflation targeting therefore requires that actual wages equal fair wages;
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that is, the following conditions must be met:
wM = w
f
M = f
M (wA, wS) (23)
wS = w
f
S = f
S(wA, wM ) (24)
We assume that the fair wages in the formal sectors exceed average incomes
in the informal sector. A non-negative wage premium is in line with the clas-
sical assumption of elastic labor supply to the modern sectors in Lewis (1954),
and a strictly positive wage premium has empirical and theoretical support.
Firms willingly pay a wage premium because it increases productivity: as in
Akerlof and Yellen (1990) and other efficiency wages models, a perception of
unfair wages can generate adverse effects on productivity via collective action,
including strikes, or by hurting ‘morale’ and reducing the ‘effort’ of individual
workers.16
2.5 Inflation targeting with constant fairness norms
Given the specification of wage setting, a positive shock to wA generates infla-
tionary pressures in the formal sectors. For given values of the predetermined
wage levels wM and wS , wage inflation is a strictly increasing function of wA,
∂wˆM
∂wA
> 0
∂wˆS
∂wA
> 0
There are asymmetries between the two sectors, however.
Consider first the effects of wage inflation in the non-tradable sector. If
wages and prices in the tradable sector stay constant, an increase in the prices
of nontradable goods will not ignite a process of continuing inflation. Nominal
spending on private and public consumption is independent of the price level in
the nontradable sectors (equation (14)). An increase in the prices of nontradable
goods therefore has no direct effect on total informal-sector incomes. However,
it reduces real output and employment in S, sending workers into the informal
sector and reducing the average income in this sector. The contraction in S also
has derived negative effects on investment, causing employment in the tradable
sector to fall, leading to a further decline in aggregate informal sector income.
Adjustments in wS/wA in response to a shock to wA therefore tend to be self-
correcting; if an increase in wA produces a rise in wS , the induced decline in wA
ensures that wS/wA will go up, moving towards a restoration of the previous
relative wage.
An increase in tradable wages and prices, by contrast, raises the nominal
demand for non-tradable goods (equation (14)). If investment and the exports
16Efficiency wage arguments for a wage premium in the formal sector can also be nutrition-
based (Leibenstein (1957)) or use a traditional utility-based approach to the determination of
‘effort’ (e.g. Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), Bowles (1985)).
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of commodities and M goods stay constant, an increase in wM produces a
proportional rise in the average nominal income in the informal sector and
leaves the ‘relative wage’ wM/wA unchanged. Nominal incomes in the S-sector,
which, as total informal sector income, are determined by C +G, also increase
proportionately, generating some combination of increases in wS and LS .
17 As
a result of these interactions between an initial rise in wA/wM and the ensuing
cost-push adjustments in tradable-sector wages and prices – which feed into
new increases in nominal demand for the informal good – the wA/wM ratio
does not return to its former value. Instead, we may get a cycle of persistent
and potentially (depending on how expectations are formed) explosive inflation.
Intuitively, this asymmetry between tradable and nontradable prices is re-
lated to a standard Keynesian multiplier process. Incomes in the tradable,
nontradable and resource sectors all generate consumption demand. A con-
stant fraction of consumption demand goes to the nontradable sector, and this
feedback creates a multiplier relation: incomes in the nontradable sector are
determined by the product of the multiplier and the ‘outside demand’ from the
tradable and resource sectors; this outside nominal demand is influenced by pM .
The two sectors differ in another way, too. The absence of foreign compe-
tition in the nontradable sector is likely to make firms less reluctant to grant
wage increases, and we would expect to see faster adjustment speeds in the
nontradable formal sector than in the tradable one.18 As a stylized version of
this difference, we consider the case in which φ′S →∞.
Assume a situation in which wS is less than its ‘fair’ value. As argued above,
an increase in wS will raise wS/wA. If wM is predetermined (adjusts slowly),
wS/wM will also increase, and, with fast wS adjustment, will converge to w
f
S .
Formally, we have
wS = f
S(wA, wM ) = wMf
S(
wA
wM
, 1)
or
wS
wM
= fS(
wA
wM
, 1) = ζ(
wA
wM
); ζ ′ > 0 (25)
Using equations (19), (21) and (25) and assuming that the central bank has
succeeded in establishing the credibility of the inflation target (pˆe = pˆT ), the
condition for wˆM = wˆS = pˆ
T can now be written
fM (
wA
wM
, ζ(
wA
wM
)) = 1 (26)
The function on the left hand side is increasing in wA/wM , and the equation
17A proportional increase in wS leaves LS unchanged but implies that the ratio of fair to
actual wages in the M -sector is unaffected by changes in wM ; a less than proportional increase
in wS implies a rise in LS , which reduces employment in the informal sector, and the average
income of informal workers now rises more than proportionately to changes in wM .
18The tradable sector may increase wages but be forced by foreign competition to absorb
some of the increase via reduced profit margins. We consider induced changes in profit margins
in section 2.8.
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defines a unique solution for the wage ratio,
wA
wM
= µ (27)
Combining equations (3), (18) and (27), we have
µ =
αA
N −M − S
1−piMs
1−piM (I +X) +
ηZ
1−piM
θ + s(αMpiM + αSpiS)
(28)
Central banks cannot control inflation perfectly and instantaneously, even at
the best of times. But because of the interactions between wages in the tradable
sector and incomes in the informal sector, it becomes imperative to stamp out
price acceleration in the tradable sector; conversely, there will be no explosive
inflationary cycle, and inflation targeting can be successful as long as central
banks keep wage inflation in the tradable sector at the target rate.19 Thus, if
wage norms are constant, successful inflation targeting implies that, on average,
equation (28) will be satisfied in the medium run, at least approximately.
Ignoring short run deviations, consider the implications of a ‘perfect’ policy
regime under which equation (28) holds at all times. Inflation targeting works
in this model because monetary policy influences the demand for the tradable
sector and thereby the relative wage and the inflation rate: there is a direct
influence of interest rates on investment (equation (7)) and an appreciation
caused by a rise in the domestic interest rate affects exports (equation (11)).
Standard interest parity arguments suggest the determination of the nominal
exchange rate E by domestic interest rates, foreign interest rates, the expected
future exchange rate, and risk considerations. Thus, let
E = E(i, i∗, Ee, τ) (29)
where i and i∗ are domestic and foreign nominal interest rates; i = r + pˆe.
The expected exchange rate Ee and the country risk τ may change in response
to resource booms and other exogenous shocks, whether domestic or interna-
tional. Subsuming these factors and the exogenous or predetermined values of
i∗, p∗M/pM , pˆ
e in the shift variable ρ, we assume that the real exchange rate is
given by
η =
p∗ME(r + pˆ
e, i∗, Ee, τ)
pM
= η(r; ρ); ηr < 0 (30)
2.6 Commodity booms, inflation targeting and the Dutch
disease
Inflation targeting endogenizes the interest rate, and equations (28) and (30)
in combination with (15)-(16) determine the levels of output in the two formal
19A focus on the derived inflationary effects of shocks is in line with the ‘consensus view’:
the professional consensus among academic and central bankers is that a central
bank should accommodate the direct price-level impact of the shock while cali-
brating monetary policy so as to avoid further rounds of price increases. (Fraga
et al. 2003, p. 32)
13
sectors, the real interest rate r and the real exchange rate η. The comparative
statics now become quite different from those in section 2.3.
Policy makers still follow principles of sound finance and maintain a non-
negative government balance; that is, we assume that  ≤ 1 stays constant. But
a commodity boom feeds consumption demand, and contractionary monetary
policy is needed to keep inflation at the target level. If r and η were to remain
constant, an increase in Z would raise M and S (section 2.3 and Appendix B),
and G+G would also increase. The average income in the informal sector would
go up and inflation would increase.
To prevent the increase in inflation, central banks raise the interest rate r
which causes the exchange rate to appreciate (η falls). The policy response leads
to a decline in M,S and C + G (section 2.3, Appendix B and (14)); the rise
in wA is curtailed and the increase in the interest rate offsets the inflationary
effects of the commodity boom and keeps inflation at the target rate.
In this policy regime, a commodity boom produces a contraction in the
tradable sector while nontradables expand. Formally, we have (see Appendix C
for details)
∂M
∂Z
< 0;
∂S
∂Z
> 0
Intuitively, interest rates have to be raised in order to avoid a violation of the
prevailing relative-wage norms and the ensuing inflation. The direct effects
of higher interest rates fall on the tradable sector: investment falls and the
currency appreciates which reduces exports.20 By contrast, the derived effects
on the consumption demand for the S and M goods are proportional. The
overall effect therefore falls more heavily on the M sector.
The shifts in the composition of formal-sector output away from tradable
goods have dynamic effects on the patterns of investment which also shift to-
wards the nontradable sector. The long-term effects of these shifts are beyond
the scope of this paper.21
2.7 Money illusion, endogenous norms and path depen-
dency
If the fairness norms were fixed and time-invariant, the analysis in section 2.6
would represent a twist on a common story: high wage demands by ‘insiders’
(in this case workers in the formal sector) can lead to high natural rates of
unemployment.
But social norms are sustained by continuous validation; they change grad-
ually when outcomes differ from expectations. Like the role of norms of fairness
20The commodity boom may reduce country risk and generate an appreciation of the ex-
change rate. If the appreciation causes a large reduction in the demand for tradable goods,
the interest rate could fall, even though the risk-adjusted rate has increased.
21Another possible impediment to long-run growth is related to net exports. As indicated
in appendix B, if X and I are not fixed, as is expected outside the short run, the combination
of a boost to aggregate demand and exchange rate appreciation tends to cause unsustainable
trade deficits and lead to future contractions. Araujo and Lima (2007) analyze implications
of balance of payments constrained growth in a multi-sectoral framework.
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in wage setting, the recognition of the conventional aspect of norms has a long
history, and evidence from social psychology and behavioral economics support
the path dependency of social norms. In the words of Kahneman, Knetsch, and
Thaler (1986) (p. 730-1),22
the reference transaction provides a basis for fairness judgments be-
cause it is normal, not because it is just. Psychological studies of
adaptation suggest that any stable state of affairs tends to become
accepted eventually, at least in the sense that alternatives to it no
longer readily come to mind. Terms of exchange that are initially
seen as unfair may in time acquire the status of reference transaction.
The conventional nature of norms can lead to hysteresis in both employment
and income distribution in a mature economy, and modified versions of the
hysteresis argument carry over to developing ones: the long-run growth rate
may be affected by macroeconomic policy in dual economies.23
Following Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (ibid.) and the behavioral evi-
dence, suppose that the fair wage ratio changes over time in response to differ-
ences between actual and fair relative wages, that is, µ changes in response to
differences between wA/wM and µ. Formally, let
µˆ = λ(
ω
µ
− 1) (31)
where ω = wA/wM .
24
Now consider a trajectory in which the wage ratio ω is kept slightly above
the fair relative wage (but below one so that the tradable sector can still attract
workers). Formally, let ω = µ+ a(1− µ) where a > 0 is small. Using equation
(31),
µ˙ = λa(1− µ) > 0
The fair wage ratio wA/wM gradually rises, and the actual ratio rises with it.
Putting it differently, the wage premium in the tradable sector is slowly eroded.
Equations (19)-(20) imply that discrepancies between fair and actual wages
produce wage inflation above the expected rate (which by assumption equals the
22Economists had made similar observations before ‘behavioral economics’. Hicks (1975)
(p. 65), for instance, argued that “no system of wages when it is called into question, will
ever be found to be fair. ... [To avoid the system being called into question] the system of
wages should be well established, so that it has the sanction of custom. It then becomes what
is expected; and (admittedly on a low level of fairness) what is expected is fair” (p. 65).
23See Skott (2005) for an analysis of path dependency in mature economies.
24The symmetric specification in equation (31) has the virtue of simplicity but misses an
important aspect of norm adjustment: fairness norms are likely to adjust quickly in an upward
direction (we quickly feel that pay increases are ‘fair’) but more slowly in a downward direction
(it is hard to accept that we deserve less than what we used to get). This asymmetry in the
adjustment of norms in combination with downward stickiness in nominal wages can make
for inflationary pressures, even if average relative wages are trendless. Thus, policy regimes
that aggravate volatility – including balanced budget rules for fiscal policy – tend to produce
a higher level of ‘baseline’ inflation.
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target rate if the latter is considered credible), and it might seem that expecta-
tions cannot remain anchored to the target. Small deviations from fairness will
be associated with only minor discrepancies of actual from expected inflation,
but natural-rate theory does not permit persistent deviations, no matter how
small; expected inflation would increase and inflation would be explosive. Here
again, however, the behavioral evidence challenges the standard story.
Norms of fairness attach to both nominal and real magnitudes. There is
strong evidence, for instance, that a fall in nominal wages is seen as unfair and
that the level of nominal wages exhibits downward stickiness (Akerlof, Dickens,
et al. (1996); Shafir, Diamond, and Tversky (1997)).25 In more general terms,
the fairness of prices or wages is assessed in relation to past nominal values
as well as in relation to the current values of other prices and wages, but the
weights of the different evaluations are context dependent (Shafir, Diamond, and
Tversky (ibid.), Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986)). Inflation becomes less
salient and purely nominal evaluations gain greater weight if inflation rates are
low. By the same token, if deviations from established inflation anchors are
small, they become less salient and may be ignored. In fact, small deviations
between actual and expected inflation are likely to go completely unnoticed.
Surveys document limited knowledge of actual inflation rates, and with finite
cognitive resources it would not even be sensible for most people to try to keep
track of small scale changes in the rate of inflation.26
Important aspects of this argument and its implications for wage inflation
were anticipated by Rowthorn (1977). Nominal evaluations and the inatten-
tion to price inflation become dominant when inflation is low; when inflation is
high, by contrast, it becomes costly to ignore price changes and expected price
inflation becomes an important determinant of wage inflation. As a simple for-
malization, Rowthorn suggested that inflation will not be taken into account in
wage bargaining as long as it stays below some threshold level.
In the present context, these behavioral arguments suggest that as long as
the deviation of the actual from target inflation is kept small, expectations can
remain anchored at the target level.27 In short, relative wage norms may be
important in developing economies, but the norms are path dependent and mi-
nor deviations of actual from expected inflation may go unnoticed or, if noticed,
may have no impact on expected future inflation. These behavioral findings
have dramatic consequences. Developing economies do not suffer from a high
25In order to include this aspect, the inflation equations could be written
wˆM = max{0, φM (
wfM
wM
) + pˆe}; φM (1) = 0, φ′M > 0 (32)
wˆS = max{0, φS(
wfS
wS
) + pˆe}; φS(1) = 0, φ′S > 0 (33)
This extension would not affect the analysis in section 2.5.
26Inattention may be ‘rational’; Sims (2003). The substance of this argument – inattention
is both sensible and behaviorally plausible – is surely right, even if the ‘rational inattention’
literature exaggerates the strict ‘rationality’ of the inattention.
27The extension of the fairness argument in section 2.8 reinforces this argument.
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‘natural rate of underemployment’ whose only remedy is ‘labor market reforms’.
Sustained non-inflationary transformation with a gradual elimination of under-
employment in the informal sector and a gradual closing of sectoral wage gaps
is perfectly possible.
The potential for explosive inflation following a large shock to relative in-
comes is also clear. A large shock to relative incomes leads to large increases
in wage pressures and large discrepancies between actual and target inflation.
The ‘inattention threshold’ may be breached, and the scene is set for an accel-
erationist inflation dynamics. The feedback effects from nominal incomes in the
formal sectors to average incomes of informal workers prevents wage inflation
in the tradable sector from restoring ‘fair’ relative wages, and although fairness
norms will be changing, its speed of adjustment is likely to be much lower than
that for inflation expectations.
2.8 Extensions and robustness
2.8.1 Specification of consumption demand
The benchmark specification of consumption assumed constant expenditure
shares. This Cobb-Douglas specification of demand with unit elasticities of
substitution between any two goods can be questioned. The substitutability
between imported and domestically produced tradable goods, for instance, is
likely to be higher than that between imported and nontradable goods.
If the assumption of fixed expenditure shares is dropped, changes in the real
exchange rate will affect the composition of demand, and another question needs
attention. In the benchmark specification, the average income in the informal
sector becomes independent of the price of informal goods. This is no longer
the case if the expenditure share for informal goods depends on relative prices.
The informal sector is characterized by underemployment and if αA depends on
relative prices, it matters whether an increase in the demand for informal goods
is met by an increase in price or by reductions in underemployment. We focus
on the simplest case in which pA is constant in the short run and changes in
demand are met by quantity adjustments (changes in A). By assumption pM
and pS are predetermined and the relative prices of all three domestic goods will
be given in the short run. A simple continuity argument ensures that the result
for fixed pA will apply also when pA depends on demand if the dependence is
weak or the sensitivity of the expenditure share αA to changes in relative prices
is low.
Now consider the key result in section 2.6: a commodity boom generates a
decline in the tradable sector if interest rates are raised to neutralize the in-
flationary pressures from increased domestic demand. As shown in Appendix
D, this result continues to hold if a real appreciation (a fall in η) (i) reduces
(or leaves constant) the share of consumption expenditure going to domesti-
cally produced tradable goods (tradable goods and imports are substitutes)
and (ii) raises (or leaves constant) the share of spending going to nontradable
goods (imports and nontradables are complements). These conditions, which
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arguably cover the cases that are most plausible empirically, are sufficient, but
not necessary, for the result to hold.
Although the result is fairly robust to changes in the specification of con-
sumption demand, there are conditions under which it does not hold. If imports
and domestically produced tradable goods are complements and investment and
exports are insensitive to changes in the interest rate and the real exchange rate,
respectively, then a commodity boom could raise output in the tradable sector
and reduce output of nontradables (see Appendix D).
2.8.2 Consumption real wages as a determinant of fair wages
The fair wage in the tradable sector may depend on the consumption real wage
as well as on relative wages; that is,
wfM = f
M (wA, wS , p)
where p is the relevant consumer price index. Workers consume a combination
of imported, tradable and non-tradable (formal and informal) goods, and the
price index is a linearly homogeneous function of the four prices:
p = ξ(Ep∗, pM , pS , pA) = ξ(pMη, pM , pS , pA)
This extension of the analysis implies that the inflation targeting condition
in equation (26) can be written as
fM (
wA
wM
, ζ(
wA
wM
), ξ(η, 1,
pS
pM
,
pA
pM
)) = 1
An appreciation of the exchange rate now increases the consumption real wage
and reduces the inflationary pressures. The qualitative effects of a commodity
boom are unchanged, however.
Including the consumption real wage as a determinant of fair wages has a
notable implication, however. Productivity gains raise real wages and therefore
facilitate gradual, non-inflationary reductions in the relative wage of workers in
the tradable sector during a process of industrialization; the inflationary effects
of declining relative wages can be offset by increasing real wages. Productivity
growth cannot, however, offset the inflationary effects of sharp shocks to relative
incomes.
2.8.3 Intermediate goods
The formal sectors in developing countries often rely on imported intermediate
goods. Thus, assume that γM and γS units of imports are required as interme-
diate inputs per unit of output in the tradable and nontradable sectors.
Exchange rate movements now affect prices and/or profit shares in the formal
sectors. If the prices stay constant, an appreciation will raise the profits shares,
but a positive shock to Z will have the same qualitative effect on M and S:
with inflation targeting, S must rise and M must fall (see Appendix E).
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If the markups on marginal cost are kept constant, both prices and profit
shares become decreasing functions of the real exchange rate η. In this case, it
is a sufficient condition for dS/dZ to be positive that d pSpM /dη ≥ 0. But weak
effects on X and I allow for the possibility that both S and M may increase
(see Appendix E).
If an appreciation (a fall in η) raises pS/pM (d
pS
pM
/dη < 0), then fixed ex-
penditure shares imply a shift in real consumption from S towards M . If this
shift is sufficiently strong to offset the negative effects of an appreciation on X
and rising interest rates on I, the outcome can be a fall in S.
Intermediate imports also affects net exports. We now have
NX = pMX(η)−θ(C+G)−[αM (C+G)+pM (I+X)]γMη−αS(C+G)γS pM
pS
η+pMηZ
Imported intermediate inputs add negative effects of exchange rate depreciation
on net exports; that is, the Marshall Lerner condition will be less likely to hold.28
A depreciation, finally, will put downward pressure on real wages and add
inflationary pressures, if the markup on marginal cost is constant and wage
demands respond to changes in the real consumption wage.
2.8.4 Imported and nontradable investment goods
The benchmark version of the model assumes that all investment goods are
produced domestically by the tradable sector. As an alternative, consider a
case in which all investment goods are imported. The qualitative effects on the
M and S sectors of a shock to commodity exports are unchanged: inflation
targeting still implies a contraction in the tradable sector and an expansion of
nontradables (see Appendix F).
It should be noted, however, that if capital goods are imported, an increase
in interest rates may influence investment, but there will be no effect on the
demand for domestically produced goods. Thus, economies with high shares of
imported capital goods must rely on exchange rate movements as the mechanism
through which monetary policy impacts inflation. These economies will require
larger movements in interest and exchange rates in order to keep inflation within
the target range following shocks to domestic demand.
If investment goods are domestically produced but partly nontradable, there
are no qualitative changes in the short run without monetary policy. With
inflation targeting, however, the qualitative results can be different, depending
mainly on the sensitivities of net exports to exchange rates and of investment
and the exchange rate to changes in interest rates (see Appendix F).
28Even in countries with a relative high share of intermediate goods imports, including the
Brazilian case analyzed in the next section, there is empirical evidence that the Marshall-
Lerner condition holds. See, for example, Gomes and Paz (2005) and Moura and Da Silva
(2005).
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2.8.5 Endogenous markups and labor productivity
Markups and profit shares need not be constant. Firms may take advantage
of boom times and increase their mark-ups and profit-shares. An increase in
profit-shares, in turn, reduces aggregate consumption. Thus, allowing for en-
dogenous markups soften the multiplier effects of shocks to demand. By conti-
nuity, however, the qualitative results of the model hold as long as the sensitivity
of profit-shares to output is low.
The benchmark model assumed constant labor productivity. Introducing
diminishing returns to labor makes the profit share endogenous, even if the
markup on marginal cost is constant. Formally, let
pi = (1 +m)
wi
F i′
where F i(Li) is the production function for sector i. The profit share is
pii = 1− F
i′Li
(1 +m)F i
The profit share will be constant if the production function has constant elas-
ticity, but increasing (decreasing) in Li if the elasticity F
i′Li/F i is decreasing
(increasing) in Li. Having diminishing returns to labor also affects the sensi-
tivity of wA to changes in Z because of its influence on LA which is no longer
given by N −M − S. Again, however, the qualitative effects on M and S of
shocks to commodity exports are unchanged, as long as the sensitivity of profit
shares to changes in output is low.
3 A brief summary of the recent Brazilian ex-
perience
3.1 Stylized facts
Brazil entered the 21st century with high hopes. The re-democratization process
initiated in the 1980s had matured, the hyperinflation of the late 1980s and
early 1990s had been squashed, and the dominant view was that by opening
the economy and reducing state interference, the country would be put on a
trajectory of sustainable growth and gradual catch-up with advanced economies.
In terms of macroeconomic policy, the strategy was expressed in a ‘tripod’ rule:
floating exchange rates, primary fiscal surplus, and inflation targeting.
The commodity boom added a new element. The Brazilian terms of trade
began to improve from 2002, peaking in 2011 and falling again to a local mini-
mum in 2015. As shown in figure 1, the net exports of commodities went from
US$ 12,9 billion in 2002 to US$ 99 billion in 2011, with the share of commodities
on total exports going from 40% to 60% in the same period.29 Surging commod-
29Data from the Ministry of Industry, Foreign Trade, and Services of Brazil - MDIC. Com-
modities are defined as: Mineral fuels, lubrificants and related materials; Food products and
live animals; and Non-edible raw materials (except fuel).
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ity exports opened up space in the balance of payments to increase imports; over
the same period the boost to domestic aggregate demand and an appreciation
of the exchange rate led to movements in net exports of non-commodities from
a US$ 250 million surplus to a US$ 69.2 billion deficit.
Figure 1: Terms of trade (June 2012=100) and Net exports (US$ Bi. FOB)
Source: IMF and Ministry of Economy, Industry, Foreign Trade, and Services of Brazil.
Authors’ calculation.
Two main channels link the increase in revenue from commodity exports
to domestic absorption: the increase in private consumption due to the higher
income in the sectors directly associated with the exports of commodities, and
the increase in government expenditure following the windfall revenue from taxes
and royalties. These initial movements were amplified by multiplier effects on
consumption and investment.
The period from 2003 to 2011 saw an acceleration of GDP growth, with an
average of 3.5% from 2002 to 2014 – and 4.5% between 2007 and 2011 – com-
pared to 2.6% in the previous decade (1992-2001). Private consumption was
the fastest-growing component of demand during the commodity boom, both
in relative and absolute terms. Aided by rising incomes at the lower end of the
income distribution and an expansion of consumer credit, private consumption
increased from 61.7% of the GDP in 2002 to 64.7% in 2011, reaching 67.4% in
2015.30 Illustratively, car sales increased by 130% between 2002 and 2011, and
the sales of home appliances rose by 242% in real terms.31 Federal government
expenditure also accelerated, reaching an annual average real growth rate of 8%
during the ascendant phase of the boom (2003-2010), compared to 5.8% from
1998 to 2002 and 3.6% between 2011 and 2015.32 Public investment also in-
30From 2002 to 2010, private investment grew more rapidly, from 18.2% to 21.8% of GDP,
but lost ground from 2011, reaching 19.3% in 2015. Brazilian National Accounts, IBGE.
31Respective sources: FENABRAVE - National Federation of Motor Vehicle Distribution
and ABINEE - Brazilian electrical and electronics industry association.
32Using data from Ministry of Economy, Industry, Foreign Trade and Services of Brazil.
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creased between 2005 and 2010, but the expenditures were largely concentrated
in consumption.33
The fiscal expansion did not violate balanced budget prescriptions, however;
the federal government maintained continuous primary fiscal surpluses – on
average 2.2% of GDP from 2002 to 201134. There is robust evidence that local
governments also used the increase in revenues directly and indirectly related to
the commodity boom to increase expenditure while preserving fiscal discipline.
The average primary surplus of the public sector, which includes federal and
local governments, was 3.1% of GDP between 2002 and 2011, and the net public
indebtedness fell from 55.8% of GDP in 2002 to 36.4% in 2011.35
Figure 2: Private consumption (C), government consumption (G), and Non-
residential investment (I) - % GDP
Source: IBGE and Bielschowsky, Squeff, and Vasconcelos (2015).
The growth rates were uneven across sectors. In the years before the in-
tensification of the commodity boom, from 2000 to 2004,36 the manufacturing
sector grew at an annual average rate of 4%, significantly above those of retail
(2.6%) and services (2.2%).37 The ranking was reversed during the ascendant
33Federal public investment went from 0.45% of GDP in 2002 to 0.79% in 2010. Total
expenditure of the federal government in the same period went from 15.9% of the GDP to
18.2%. Ministry of Economy, Industry, Foreign Trade and Services of Brazil and Observato
rio de Politica Fiscal - IBRE/FGV.
34The average total federal deficit including interest payments was 3.2% of GDP in the same
period. The public debt ratio fell however, which is in line with fiscal policy prescriptions.
35Data from Banco Central do Brasil. Orair and Gobetti (2017) provide slightly different
numbers; they suggest a reduction in public debt from 60% of GDP in 2002 to 31% in 2013.
36Manufacturing might have benefited from the depreciations of the exchange rate in 1999
and 2002. The increase in manufacturing employment, for instance, is concentrated in 2004
and 2005, and the most positive net exports result since 1997 was achieved in 2006, with a
surplus of US$ 14.5 billions. Thus, looking at sectoral data, it is important to bear in mind
that effects from previous shocks still operate during the initial years of the commodity boom.
37Identified as other services in the Brazilian national account system, which comprises all
usual private services such as education, health, lodging and food services, domestic services,
amoung others.
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part of the boom years from 2005 to 2011 when the rate of growth of manufac-
turing sector was 2.3%, and those of retail and services increased to 4.7% and
4%. From 2011 to 2015 the gap is even wider, with manufacturing decreasing
annually 3.1% while retail and services changed, on average, -0.2% and 0.8%.
Trade contributed to the heterogeneous sectoral development. The real ex-
change rate appreciated and manufacturing faced intensified international com-
petition. During 2005-2008, more than 22% of the increase in domestic con-
sumption of manufactures was supplied by net imports, compared to only 6.1%
in the period 2003-2005. In the cases of durable goods, this share of net im-
ports went from 0% in 2003-2005 to 49.3% in 2005-08 (Bielschowsky, Squeff,
and Vasconcelos (2015)). Services, by contrast, are largely nontradable and
performed better, as can be seen in terms of profitability and value-added in
figure 3. Around 6 percentage points of GDP was ‘transferred’ from the man-
ufacturing sector to non-tradables between 2004 and 2014. The profit-share of
the manufacturing sector decreased from 52.2% in 2004 to 29.9% in 2014, while
in nontradables it was relatively stable - a large increase in the profit share in
services (from 19.6% to 30.6% in the same period) was offset by its decline in
public utilities38 and construction sectors. Investment shows a similar pattern
in favor of non-tradable activities: according to Miguez (2016), before the inten-
sification of the commodity boom (2001-2004), the average annual growth rate
of investment in real terms was -4.2% for the manufacturing sector and -7.5% for
a sector combining retail and other services activities; during the boom period
(2005-2011), these rates went to 6.6% and 14.6%, respectively.39
Figure 3: Non-tradable and Tradable sectors - VA and profitability (2002=1)
Source: Author’s calculation based on IBGE. ’Non-tradables’ consistent of the services
sector, retail and construction. In line with the model definition, ’tradables’ is the
manufacturing sector.
Faster economic growth was reflected in the labor market. Measured unem-
ployment decreased from around 12% in 2002 to less than 5% in 2014, and for-
malization went from 52% to more than 63% in the same period (Komatsu and
38Electricity, water, sewage.
39Rugitsky (2017) suggests another source of uneven sectoral performance. Many services
have high income elasticities of demand at intermediate income levels, and domestic demand,
therefore, shifted towards services as growth rates increased and inequality fell.
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Menezes Filho (2015)).40 Once again sectoral differences are relevant. The ratio
of (formal plus informal) nontradable to tradable employment stayed roughly
constant, but there was a significant shift from the informal to the formal non-
tradable sector (figure 4). In terms of the model in section 2, LA/LS fell while
LM/(LA + LS) was stable. This dynamics, combined with the increase in the
share of value added of the nontradable sectors (formal and informal), displayed
in figure 3, suggests a reduction in the level of underemployment in the non-
tradable, informal sector.
The commodity boom and the associated increase in private and govern-
ment consumption produced inflationary pressures (see figure 5). Wages rose
significantly, but despite the superior dynamics in the nontradable sector in
the period, sectoral relative wages shifted only slightly against manufacturing
workers (see figure 4). Manufacturing workers managed to raise their nominal
wage roughly in step with wage increases in the nontradable sectors. In terms
of the model, the relative wage wMwS stayed roughly constant while
wM
wA
decreased
slightly.41 In the non-tradable sectors, this increase in wages was passed on to
prices, as the profit-share figures indicate. Given international competition, a
large part of wage increases in the manufacturing sector was absorbed by re-
ductions in profitability, accentuating the conflict over the functional income in
the sector. The number of strikes went from 302 (23.138 hours) in 2004 to 2.050
(111.342 hours) in 2013 (DIEESE (2005), DIEESE (2014)). Besides the market
forces, minimum wage policy also had important impacts. With a real increase
of 68% between 2004 and 2014, it affected low wage formal workers, informal
workers (via a ‘signaling’ effect) and social transfers (including pensions), which
are indexed by the minimum wage42. The exact weight of each of these effects
are not clear, but there is some evidence that the impact via government trans-
fers (which is incorporated in the model presented in section 2 as government
consumption) accounts for about half of its effect on the lowest income levels
(Saboia and Hallak Neto (2018)).
After a spike in inflation in 2002-2003 due to capital flight and a steep
depreciation on the eve of the presidential election of Lula from the Workers
Party (PT), inflation was kept consistently within the target range from 2004
to 2014. Price movements displayed sectoral heterogeneity, however. Inflation
in the service sector remained consistently above average inflation, exceeding
the target range from 2008 to 2016. High inflation in services was offset by
the lower inflation for (non-commodity) tradable goods and the output of state-
owned companies, including oil (Petrobras) and electricity (Eletrobras).
The downward pressure on tradable goods prices was a result, to a large
40Data for metropolitan areas.
41The reduction in wage inequality and extreme poverty is an important element of the
Brazilian trajectory in the period. For the purposes of this paper, we focus on the relative
wages in sectorial terms and their implications for structural change; see Souza and Medeiros
(2015) for a critical discussion of the evidence on changes in personal income inequality during
this period.
42These effects of minimum wage increase are more directly analyzed by Neri, Gonzaga,
and Camargo (2001), Oreiro and D’Agostini (2017), and Serrano and Summa (2015), among
others.
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Figure 4: Ratio of Non-tradable to Tradable sectors - Wages and Employment
(2002=1)
Source: Author’s calculation based on IBGE and RAIS/Ministry of Work and Employment
of Brazil.
extent, of monetary policy. The basic interest rate (SELIC) followed a downward
trend from 2002 to 2008, but the premium over international rates (the LIBOR
is used here) was kept high despite a significant reduction in country risk as
measured by the EMBI+ index.43 A high interest premium encouraged the
inflow of international capital, reinforcing pressures from the commodity boom
towards exchange rate appreciation in both nominal and real terms. The policy
was intensified as inflation pressures increased, particularly between 2010 and
2011, as can be seen from the steep increase in the interest rate differential
despite a stable country-risk (figure 6).
From 2011 to 2014, macroeconomic policy became erratic. For present pur-
poses, it is sufficient to note that fiscal policy remained expansionary most of
the time,44 although with changes in its composition, and that monetary policy
was loosened briefly in 2012 and early 2013.45
Macroeconomic policy returned to more strict principles of inflation target-
43The source for the annual Brazilian basic interest rate is the Central Bank of Brazil, and
the annual London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) based on U.S. dollars was obtained via
the FRED (Federal Reserve Economic Data - St. Louis FED). The EMBI+ index is produced
by JP Morgan.
44There was a brief period of fiscal consolidation in 2011.
45The policy adopted in this period reversed some of the previous dynamics, by reducing
interest rates and depreciating the exchange rate. Others, however, were reinforced, namely
by cutting public investments while keeping balanced budgets. It can also be argued that
erratic movements in the economic policy undermined predictability regarding future demand
and interest and exchange rates, limiting the potential benefits of the change in monetary
policy.
25
Figure 5: Inflation
Source: IBGE and the Brazilian Central Bank. Author’s elaboration.
ing and balanced budgets in 2015. The end of the commodity boom, a decel-
eration in consumer credit, and lower economic growth meant that balanced
budgets now implied fiscal contraction. The liberalization of state-controlled
prices and an exchange rate depreciation (following the reversal of terms of
trade) produced a spike in inflation in 2015, despite a tightening of monetary
policy. Inflation returned to its target in 2017 in the wake of the severe crisis
that had reduced real GDP by 6.7% over those two years.
Stagnation since then has left GDP in 2019 well below the level in 2014 -
the average annual growth rate was 1.2% between 2017 and 2019. Many of the
social improvements have also been reversed, with a consistent rise in income
inequality; extreme poverty reached 13.8 million people in 2019, an increase of
53% since 2014.
3.2 Interpretations
3.2.1 Our story
The stylized facts of the recent Brazilian trajectory are consistent with the the-
oretical framework proposed in section 2. A commodity boom allows an expan-
sion of private and government consumption with a stable or falling debt ratio.
The boost in consumption reduces underemployment in precarious occupations,
increases the average income in the informal sector and creates wage pressures
in the formal sectors. In the Brazilian case the pressures were reinforced by ris-
ing minimum wages and policy-induced relaxations of credit constraints. Tight
monetary policies counteract the incipient inflationary tendencies; these policies
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Figure 6: Relative interest rate, country-risk and real exchange rate
Source: IBGE, Central Bank of Brazil, JP Morgan, FRED. ’RER’ is an index of the real
exchange rate (Jan 2000 = 1), ’Country-risk’ is the EMBI+ (scaled to fit the left axis,
preserving changes magnitudes), and ’Relative interest rate’ is the difference between the
annual basic interest rate in Brazil (SELIC) and the annual London Interbank Offered Rate
(LIBOR), based on U.S. Dollar.
impact the manufacturing sector disproportionately as interest rates rise and the
exchange rate appreciates. Endogenous profit margins reinforce the effects of
higher nontradable inflation on relative prices, and manufacturing experiences a
substantial decline in profitability. Falling capacity utilization and profitability
means that investment in the tradable sector also falls.
If our interpretation is correct, macroeconomic policy during the boom years
contributed to deindustrialization and left the economy in a fragile position when
commodity prices fell. The policy prescriptions also failed when the crisis hit.
Attempts to balance the budget aggravated the downturn and prolonged the
recession, while reallocations of government spending away from public invest-
ment and towards consumption reinforced the shift in favor of the nontradable
sectors.
The commodity boom and bust in Brazil exemplify the large external shocks
that buffet many developing economies. The standard macroeconomic prescrip-
tions magnify the effects of external shocks with serious adverse implications for
economic development.
Needless to say, other factors and policies also influence economic develop-
ment. Education, health and industrial policies can be crucial, and these poli-
cies interact with the macroeconomic variables. Guzman, Ocampo, and Stiglitz
(2018), for instance, stress the complementarity between exchange rate and in-
dustrial policies in boosting sectors with positive externalities and high level
and growth rate of productivity. Staying with the Brazilian example, moreover,
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the sources of the multidimensional, still ongoing crisis also include corruption
scandals, political polarization and class conflict.46
3.2.2 Other interpretations
A typical narrative grounded in the ’New Neoclassical Synthesis’ (Goodfriend
and King (1997)) explains the increase in growth rates from 2002 by a combi-
nation of (i) solid macroeconomic foundations built and consolidated after 1994
and lasting until at least 2006, with (ii) a favorable international environment
and (iii) a demographic dividend from having a high share of the population
being of working age (Pessoˆa (2018); Pessoˆa (2017); Mesquita et al. (2014)).
From 2008, however, credit expansion, public investment and other expansion-
ary policies led to inflationary pressures and crowding-out of private investment.
The crisis, according to this interpretation, was brought about in part by the
exhaustion of the consumption-led dynamics based on public expenditure and
increasing debt but, more importantly, by the weakening of the ‘macroeconomic
foundations’ as a result of fiscal expansion, misguided state intervention, and
a lack of reforms that, allegedly, could have increased productivity.47 Similar
conclusions can be found in other studies, including the World Bank (2017). The
explanation of the rise and fall of the Brazilian economy in Garber et al. (2019)
also focuses on aggregate demand, particularly the expansion of household credit
which was facilitated by the favorable international environment.
All these accounts, like ours, emphasize the commodity boom and the expan-
sion of aggregate domestic demand. Unlike in our interpretation, however, there
is no detailed analysis of the sources of the inflationary pressures and the role of
inflation targeting, and sectoral interactions and exchange rate movements are
secondary, if relevant at all.
Points of convergence are harder to find between our interpretation and
studies that have a New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) at the core. Most
econometric studies on Brazilian data find little support for the NKPC (Sach-
sida (2013) and Maka, Barbosa, et al. (2013), among others).48 The NKPC,
nonetheless, is included as a key element of DSGE models that are used to
guide both monetary policy and private decisions, including the SAMBA model
developed by the Brazilian Central Bank (De Castro et al. (2015)).49 These
models, in our view, make assumptions that preclude the essence of the devel-
opment problem: underemployment and problems of structural transformation
46See, for instance, Singer (2020)
47According to this argument productivity enhancing reforms should have been carried
out in education, the legal system and the labor market. The misguided intervention involved
industrial policy, regulatory interferences in the energy sector and elsewhere, forced reductions
in interest rates, and the use of tax exceptions to firms from 2011.
48Maka and Barbosa (2017) provide a slightly more positive assessment. Testing four types
of Phillips curves (accelerationist, new Keynesian, hybrid, and sticky information) for Brazil
between 1996 and 2015 and using a larger than usual confidence interval, they could not reject
the sticky information version.
49A special issue of the Brazilian Review of Econometrics (November 2015) presents and
discusses a number of Brazilian DSGE models, including the SAMBA model.
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disappear from sight in models of cyclical fluctuations around a steady growth
path with ‘natural unemployment’.
The (post-)Keynesian literature views the expansion of aggregate demand
as central to the increase in economic growth, emphasizes exchange rate move-
ments, and sees cost-push factors as the dominant force behind inflation. There
are disagreements within this literature, however, with respect to the limits of
the process and the reasons for the downturn. At one extreme, the recession
and subsequent stagnation are seen as consequences of the fiscal contraction in
2011 and the ensuing attempts to boost private investment. In these accounts,
the sectoral changes were of secondary importance for the macro dynamics, and
it is suggested that by reducing cost-push inflation, the exchange rate apprecia-
tion had more positive than negative effects. At the other extreme, it is argued
that despite positive short run effects on capacity utilization, a policy regime of
fiscal expansion, high interest rates and an overvalued exchange rate was fated
to fail in the medium run; adverse effects on the profitability of manufacturing,
the level of investment, and the balance of payments would make this regime
unsustainable. Serrano and Summa (2015) represents an example closer to the
first group; Martins and Rugitsky (2018) is closer to the second. 50
Other contributions also combine increasing aggregate demand, exchange
rate movements and cost-push inflation. Rossi, Mello, and Bastos (2020) ar-
gue that the constitution of a mass consumer market was a deliberate economic
strategy of the PT governments led by Lula and Rousseff. The idea was that the
expansion of domestic demand could play a developmental role via economies
of scale and the reduction in underemployment. The failure to meet the first
objective, they argue, was due to limitations of the process itself (the consump-
tion boom based on an appreciated exchange rate) and a lack of complementary
policies (capital controls to avoid volatility, for instance).51
Discussing monetary policy, Serrano (2010) suggests that inflation control is
ultimately achieved via the exchange rate appreciation caused by high interest
rates. The combination of high interest rate and an appreciated exchange rate,
however, increases the burden of public debt and the opportunity cost of capital,
harms the manufacturing sector and has the potential to deteriorate the external
balance.52 Summa and Serrano (2018) reinforce the argument, emphasizing
the centrality of the price effect of the exchange rate: an increase in interest
rates, they argue, has negligible effects on investment, while an exchange rate
50A similar argument is made in Martins (2017).
51Dweck, Chaves, and Chernavsky (2013) also focus on the possible ‘virtuous cycle’ of
demand expansion, economic growth and productivity gains, but seem to present a more
positive view of the process until 2013.
52Similar conclusions are presented by Summa (2011). The dangers of an overvalued ex-
change rate are also emphasized by Barbosa-Filho (2011). Using data from 1999 to 2014,
Barbosa-Filho (2015) estimates the pass-through of the exchange rate to prices in the Brazil-
ian case and presents some evidence in favor of the hypothesis elaborated in Barbosa-Filho
(2014) that the real exchange rate level has a positive impact on long-term inflation. In a
similar line, J. M. Braga (2013) empirical study suggests that inflation between 2000 and 2010
was determined mainly by two elements: exchange rate and commodity prices. In the second
half of the period, wage growth also became important, especially for services prices.
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appreciation stimulates aggregate demand via higher real wages. Nassif, Feijo´,
and Arau´jo (2020), in a broader assessment of recent macroeconomic policy in
Brazil, follow a similar argument, presenting evidence that inflation control in
Brazil is achieved via the exchange rate and that fiscal policy design is pro-
cyclical; they say little about the sources of inflation, however, suggesting that
inflation is a “very complex phenomenon” (p. 751, 758).
Summa (2016) develops a model of distributive conflict and cost-push infla-
tion. Disaggregating output into monitored goods, industrial goods, food, and
services, he suggests that the price movements of tradables follow inflation in
the rest of the world and the exchange rate, while the price of nontradables are
determined by minimum wages and productivity, prices of imported inputs in
domestic currency, firm’s mark-up, and supply shocks (such as crop failures).
Increases in the minimum wage have a direct impact on consumption and on
the price of ‘low-skill’ services and, in conjunction with other measures, raised
workers’ bargaining power, leading to stronger wage inflation from 2006.
Sectoral distinctions are also central to the analysis in Carvalho and Rugit-
sky (2015), Rugitsky (2017), Loureiro (2020), and Brenck and Carvalho (2019).
These studies emphasize linkages between falling wage inequality, economic
growth, and inflation in the services sector.53 Income growth for the poorest
half of the population shifted the consumption pattern to both manufactured
goods with higher technological content and nontradables that are intensive in
low skill labor. The shifts, it is argued, generated a deterioration of the trade
account, as those manufactured goods were mostly imported, but also boosted
the growth rate of low incomes because of the increased demand for low-skill
services.54
As should be apparent, our analysis has elements in common with many
of these contributions. Monetary policy controls inflation in large part through
induced movements in the exchange rate as in Serrano (2010); inflation targeting
can hurt investment and economic growth, as in Barbosa-Filho (2011)55; the role
of the increase in incomes at the bottom of the distribution can have inflationary
effects, as in Summa (2016); sectoral interactions are important as in Carvalho
and Rugitsky (2015).56 Other elements of our framework have affinities with the
‘new developmentalism’ (Bresser-Pereira, Jose Luis Oreiro, and Marconi (2014))
and with a broader and older literature on the relationship between commodity
exports, exchange rate appreciation, and development.57
53Marconi, Rocha, and Magacho (2016) also focuses on sectoral patterns, but particularly
on the direct capacity of commodity exports to drive technological development
54Santos et al. (2018) point out that the services inflation in Brazil would be well explained
by the effects proposed both by Clark (1940) (services as ’superior’ goods) and Baumol and
Bowen (1965) (services productivity grow less than the rest of the economy).
55Lima and Setterfield (2008) also analyze inflation targeting within a post-Keynesian frame-
work, arguing that the greater the focus inflation, the less stable will be the system.
56Interactions between an elastic labor supply (dual economy) and the exchange rate have
also been explored, for instance in Porcile and Lima (2010).
57Bresser-Pereira and Rugitsky (2018) discuss its history. See Ros (2013) for a broad dis-
cussion of traditional development theory and its more recent directions.
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4 Conclusion
Conventional macroeconomic policy prescriptions have been centered around
principles of sound finance, with fiscal policies that keep public debt low, and
a monetary policy focused on inflation targeting. These prescriptions are ques-
tionable. For advanced economies, structural aggregate demand problems may
require sustained fiscal stimulus if full employment growth is to be maintained
(e.g. Ryoo and Skott (2013); Summers (2015)), and inflation targeting may
simply validate high unemployment and cause great harm if there is no natural
rate of unemployment. But the damage from the policy prescriptions can be
even greater in developing economies.
Advanced economies have ‘full employment’ as a guidepost for policy, even
if the guidepost is highly imperfect. In dual economies the notion of full em-
ployment cannot help guide policy. Underemployment is pervasive, and the
development problem is all about structural transformation and the expansion
of the modern sector. In this setting, the twin pillars of sound finance and
inflation targeting can impede the development process and lead to premature
deindustrialization.
Behind these pillars lies a presumption that when it comes to macroeconomic
policy, ‘the rest’ can be left to the market as long as the government keeps its own
house in order (balances its books) and ensures price stability. This presumption
is overly optimistic. ‘The rest’ cannot be left to the market. Macroeconomic
policies influence the sectoral composition of output and investment, and these
variables are crucial for any development strategy.
It is widely recognized that the application of the standard prescriptions to
developing economies poses challenges. Fraga, Goldfajn, and Minella (2003), for
instance, point out that volatile environments may make it harder for central
banks to establish the credibility of inflation targets. But the problem with
volatility runs deeper. There is no reason to expect symmetry between the
effects of over and undervaluation of the real exchange rate; Razmi, Rapetti,
and Skott (2012) find a negative effect of real exchange rate volatility as well
as a positive long-run effect of undervalued exchange rates for developing coun-
tries. Balanced budgets and inflation targeting aggravate the volatility of the
real exchange rate and of the demand conditions facing the modern sector in
developing economies; the standard policy prescriptions become impediments to
growth and structural transformation in these economies, even if overvaluation
of the exchange rate is avoided on average.
By questioning inflation targeting we do not suggest that high inflation is
desirable. The sources of inflation are critical, however, for the formulation of a
successful development strategy without high inflation, and the New Keynesian
Phillips Curve – even with ad hoc augmentations – provides an inadequate
platform for understanding inflation; this is the case for advanced economies,
but even more so for developing ones.
If our argument in this paper is correct, distributional conflict over relative
wages are central to inflation in developing economies. Although the modern
sector faces an elastic supply of labor, social norms regarding relative wages can
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create strong inflationary pressures in the formal sector if shocks to domestic
demand produce a sharp increase in the average incomes of workers in the
informal sector. Inflation is the result of a nexus of demand-determined incomes
in the informal sector, relative-wage norms, and cost push inflation in the formal
sectors.
Windfall gains from a commodity boom exemplify the dangers from follow-
ing the standard policy prescriptions. The gains relax balance of payments
constraints and allow the expansion of domestic demand without running pub-
lic deficits. The joy may be short-lived, however, if the expansion of demand
produces inflationary pressures, rising interest rates and an overvalued exchange
rate. This scenario – and an ensuing Dutch disease – is perfectly compatible
with a macroeconomic policy package of balanced budgets and successful infla-
tion targeting.
Crucially, fairness norms need not present a significant barrier to develop-
ment. Structural transformation may be facilitated by modest rates of infla-
tion,58 but the path dependency of social norms implies that the expansion of
the modern sector and the gradual reduction in the wage premium for formal
sector workers can be achieved without provoking high or explosive inflation.
Full employment is not a meaningful target in developing economies, but a
commodity boom provides an opportunity to speed up the development process
without squeezing current consumption or running into balance of payments
problems. Policy can be adjusted so as to guide the windfall gains from a
commodity boom towards faster expansion of the modern sector rather than
immediate consumption, thereby reducing inflationary pressures and securing
sustainable increases in average incomes and reductions in wage inequality as the
formal sector expands. Private investment in the tradable sector will not accel-
erate, however, if exchange rate appreciation makes the sector uncompetitive.59
Thus, interest rates should be kept low and combined with other measures (e.g.
capital controls) in order to avoid exchange rate appreciation and high volatility.
Going beyond the formal analysis in this paper, it is important to stress
that significant short-term improvements for low-income groups can be made
compatible with sustainable development and may indeed promote the develop-
ment process. Changes in tax structures and public spending patterns influence
relative incomes, and the way in which benefits flow to the poor is likely to
affect inflation and, consequently, the reaction of macroeconomic policy. Im-
58Anecdotally, but quite strikingly, the average annual inflation rate in Korea was above
10% during 30 years of miracle growth from 1960 to 1990, with several spikes above 25%.
Studies consistently have found non-linear effects of inflation on economic growth. Even
papers explicitly favor the thesis that the relation is negative have found that there is no
statistical relationship for inflation levels below 8% (Sarel (1996)) or 15% (Barro (1995)), for
instance. In another influential paper, Bruno and Easterly (1998) argue that there is no robust
evidence in favor of such relationship for inflation levels below 40%, and that the correlation is
actually positive from 1961-1973. This result is corroborated by Pollin and Zhu (2006); they
extend the period to 1961-2000 and find a positive relationship relationship between growth
and inflation for low-income countries with inflation rates below 15%.
59For evidence that exchange rate influences investment surges episodes, see, for instance,
Libman, Montecino, and Razmi (2019)
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provements in health services and education, and investment in infrastructure
– including sanitation, public transport, electricity and internet services – can
be targeted towards low-income groups and are less likely to set off an inflation-
ary spiral than a general boost to consumption, with its derived effects on the
market incomes of workers in the nontradable sectors.
Access to public services has been secondary in much of the recent discus-
sion of inequality and welfare policies; the focus instead has been on personal
income.60 Public services, however, can be essential for reducing social inequal-
ity.61 And they are highly valued. The 2013 protests that, in some sense,
initiated the recent and still ongoing political instability in Brazil were sparked
by opposition to an increase in the cost of public transport. According to An-
tunes and R. Braga (2014), the underlying anger was rooted in a combination
of stagnating social mobility, particularly among those that had recently moved
into the formal market, and a demand for better public services. The protests
arguably expressed the sentiment that “the quality of life inside the home has
improved, but this is not reflected outside” (Haddad (2012), Couto (2014)).62
As Lavinas (2017) put it
[T]he upward social mobility observed in Brazil in the years spanning
2003-2014 failed to even come close to promoting a true expansion
of the country’s middle classes. In Brazil, the market has univer-
salized access to color TVs and fridges among those in the lowest
income quintile. Treated water, however, to say nothing of adequate
sanitation, remains a luxury, the province of few. (p. 86)
It should be acknowledged, before closing, that the model in this paper has
obvious limitations. An important one is the short run focus of the analysis.
Accumulation rates may be relatively insensitive to short run variations in the
utilization rates, but this insensitivity does not carry over to the long run.
Endogenous changes in labor productivity - whether through learning-by-doing
or induced changes in R&D - would also need to be included in the analysis
of long-run effects of overvalued exchange rates; as is well known, extensions
of this kind can produce development traps (e.g. Ros (2013)). Fiscal policy,
moreover, has not been discussed in any detail and industrial policy not at all,
while balance of payments constraints have been touched on only tangentially.
Our purpose in this paper has been quite narrow. Combining and modifying
ideas from a range of existing work, we have presented a model of inflationary
pressures in developing economies. The methodology is different from that of
60Saad Filho (2016) and Currie and Gahvari (2008) present, from different perspectives,
arguments for why policies other than cash-transfers might be important. For an assessment
of the shift towards cash transfers in welfare policies, see Lavinas (2013), for instance.
61The long-term effects of improvements in health and education may be obvious, but access
to public services like transportation also impact professional (as well as leisure) opportunities;
Pereira et al. (2020).
62At about the same time a very similar diagnosis emerged, but related to the importance
of public services and macro policy for the productive structure of the country: ’Within the
factory gates, a continuous improvement in efficiency and productivity. Outside the same
gates, unacceptable transaction costs’ (Barros and Giambiagi (2008), p. XII).
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contemporary macroeconomics and, unlike DSGE models, we have focused on
underemployment, sectoral differences and the need for structural transforma-
tion in developing economies. The model implies that a macroeconomic policy
package that combines balanced budgets and inflation targeting can impede the
economic development of middle-income countries.
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Appendix A: Keynesian stability conditions
We have
M = F (M,S,Z, η, r) = αM
(1− piMs)(I(M,S, r) +X(η)) + ηZ
θ + s(αMpiM + αSpiS)
+ I(M,S, r) +X(η)
S = G(M,S,Z, η, r) = αS
pM
pS
(1− piMs)(I(M,S, r) +X(η)) + ηZ
θ + s(αMpiM + αSpiS)
where
F1 =
αM
αS
pS
pM
G1 + I1 > 0; G1 = Ω(1− piMs)I1(M,S, r) > 0
F2 =
αM
αS
pS
pM
G2 + I2 > 0; G2 = Ω(1− piMs)I2(M,S, r) > 0
F3 =
αM
αS
pS
pM
G3 > 0; G3 = Ωη > 0
F4 =
αM
αS
pS
pM
G4 +X
′ > 0; G4 = Ω[(1− piMs)X ′(η) + Z] > 0
F5 =
αM
αS
pS
pM
G5 + I3 < 0; G5 = Ω(1− piMs)(I3(M,S, r) < 0
Ω = αS
pM
pS
1
θ + s(αMpiM + αSpiS)
Standard Keynesian adjustment assumptions imply that
M˙ = λM [F (M,S,Z, η, r)−M ]
S˙ = λS [G(M,S,Z, η, r)− S]
where λM and λS are the adjustment speeds in the two sectors. The Jacobian
is given by
J(σM , σS) =
 λM (F1 − 1) λMF2
λSG1 λS(G2 − 1)

Stability requires that
DetJ = λMλS [(1− F1)(1−G2)−G1F2] > 0
TR(J) = λM (F1 − 1) + λS(G2 − 1) < 0
The conditions are satisfied for all positive adjustment speeds (λM > 0, λS > 0)
if
G1F2 < (1− F1)(1−G2)
F1 < 1
G2 < 1
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Appendix B: non-tradable comparative statics –
constant interest and exchange rate
We have
M = F (M,S,Z, η, r) (34)
S = G(M,S,Z, η, r) (35)
Using the implicit function theorem, it follows that for any exogenous variable
x,  ∂M∂x
∂S
∂x
 =
 1− F1 −F2
−G1 1−G2
−1 ∂F∂x
∂G
∂x

=
1
(1− F1)(1−G2)−G1F2
 1−G2 F2
G1 1− F1
 ∂F∂x
∂G
∂x

and – using the results in Appendix A for the signs of partials – we get
∂M
∂Z
=
F3(1−G2) + F2G3
(1− F1)(1−G2)−G1F2 > 0;
∂S
∂Z
=
G1F3 + (1− F1)G3
(1− F1)(1−G2)−G1F2 > 0
∂M
∂η
=
F4(1−G2) + F2G4
(1− F1)(1−G2)−G1F2 > 0;
∂S
∂η
=
G1F4 + (1− F1)G4
(1− F1)(1−G2)−G1F2 > 0
∂M
∂r
=
F5(1−G2) + F2G5
(1− F1)(1−G2)−G1F2 < 0;
∂S
∂r
=
G1F5 + (1− F1)G5
(1− F1)(1−G2)−G1F2 < 0
Turning to net exports, we have
NX = pMX(η)− θ(C +G) + pMηZ
With predetermined investment, I = I¯, the link between consumption C + G
and the level of output in the tradable sector becomes very simple,
M =
αM
pM
(C +G) + I¯ +X
and
∂ αMpM (C +G)
∂Z
=
∂M
∂Z
Hence, using the expressions in Appendix A for the partials F1, F2, F3, G1 and
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G3, we have F1 = F2 = G1 = G2 = 0 and
∂NX
∂Z
= [− θ
αM
∂ αMpM (C +G)
∂Z
+ η]pM
= [
−θ
αM
∂M
∂Z
+ η]pM
= [
−θ
αM
F3(1−G2) + F2G3
(1− F1)(1−G2)−G1F2 + η]pM
= [
−θ
αM
F3
1
+ η]pM
= [
−θη
θ + s(αMpiM + αSpiS)
+ η]pM > 0
where the inequality follows from 0 < θ < 1 and, by assumption,  ≤ 1 (no fiscal
deficit). The term s(αMpiM + αSpiS) in the denominator is the derived effect
on domestic saving following a unit increase in consumption. These derived
domestic saving effects are positive, and an increase in commodity revenues
therefore generates an increase in net exports when investment is predetermined.
By continuity, the qualitative results are unchanged when the effects on in-
vestment of changes in output are weak. Strong investment effects, however,
could reverse the result; this possibility is not excluded by the Keynesian stabil-
ity conditions. Intuitively, a positive commodity shock has a direct impact on
domestic consumption with derived effects on investment, domestic saving and
imports. The trade balance may deteriorate if the derived effects on investment
exceed the derived effects on saving. This possibility is compatible with the
Keynesian stability condition which requires that the derived effects on invest-
ment must be less than the sum of the derived effects on domestic saving and
imports.
Analogous to the case with shifts in commodity exports, the effects of depre-
ciations are ambiguous without additional restrictions. A depreciation increases
total exports X(η)+ηZ but large derived investment effects may cause imports
to rise even more.
Using the expression for (C +G) in equation (14), the effects of an increase
in the domestic interest rate are unambiguously positive,
∂NX
∂r
= −θ∂(C +G)
∂r
> 0
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Appendix C: Short-run comparative statics – in-
flation targeting
We have
M =
αM
pM
(C +G) + I(M,S, r) +X(η) (36)
S =
αS
pS
(C +G) (37)
wA =
αA
N −M − S (C +G) (38)
where
C +G =
pM [(1− piMs)(I +X) + ηZ]
θ + s(αMpiM + αSpiS)
The new equilibrium, following the rise in Z, must have an increase in S and
C+G (they move together) and a fall in M compared to the equilibrium before
the commodity boom. To see this, we show that a constant S would lead to a
contradiction and that S must increase.
Assume that dZ > 0, dr > 0, dη < 0, dS = d(C + G) = 0. To keep wA
constant, we now must have dM = 0 in order to keep N −M − S unchanged.
The change in M , however, is given by dM = αMpM d(C+G)+dI+dX = dI+dX.
Since we know that η has fallen and r has risen, dX < 0 and dI = IMdM +
ISdS+Irdr < IMdM. It now follows that (1−IM )dM < 0 and we have reached
a contradiction; if r is raised sufficiently to make S unchanged, then the tradable
sector must contract and the result would be a decline in informal sector wages.
The new equilibrium must involve a smaller rise in r which means that the
output of the nontradable formal sector must expand.
Inflation targeting is based on the presumption that an increase in the real
interest rate will reduce inflation. In the present context, this means that a rise
in r must cause wA to fall and that the rise in r must be smaller than the rise
that would give dS = 0.
The decline in M follows from the observation that an increase in S (and
thereby in C + G) must be matched by a fall in M + S to prevent an increase
in the average income in the informal sector.
Appendix D: Endogenous expenditure shares
Changes in the real exchange rate is the only source of short run movements in
relative prices if the prices of domestically produced goods are predetermined.
The consumption shares depend on relative prices and we assume that imported
consumption goods and domestically produced tradable goods are substitutes
while imports and nontradables are complements. Formally,
∂αM
∂η
> 0,
∂αS
∂η
< 0,
∂αA
∂η
=
αA
αS
∂αS
∂η
< 0 (39)
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The last inequality says that exchange rate movements have the same propor-
tional effect on the formal and informal nontradables, leaving the ratio αA/αS
unchanged.
Inflation targeting implies that a positive shock to Z is met by a rise in
interest rates and a decline in η (an appreciation) that keeps average incomes in
the informal sector unchanged. Proceeding along the same lines as in Appendix
C, we first show that compared with the pre-shock equilibrium, the output of
nontradables must increase. Assume that S were unchanged. Using equations
(39) and (37)-(38) this implies that M would also have to be unchanged in order
for wA to stay constant. But using equation (36) we have dM < 0, following
the same steps as in Appendix B.
Still following the steps in Appendix B, we can conclude that S and thereby
wALA = wA(N −M −S) must increase. To keep wA unchanged it follows that
LA must increase which – with an increase in S – requires a decline in M . Thus,
the results are robust to endogenous expenditures shares.
A simple example in which inflation targeting leads to an increase in M and
a decline in S can be constructed with I = I¯ , X = X¯, s = 0, θ and αA constant,
α′M (η) = −α′S(η) < 0 (since αS + αM = 1− θ − αA is constant) and pM > pS .
With these assumptions, we have (using (36)-(37)
−(dM + dS) = (αM
pM
+
αS
pS
)d(C +G) +
1
pM
(C +G)dαM +
1
pS
(C +G)dαS
= (
αM
pM
+
αS
pS
)d(C +G) + (C +G)(
1
pM
− 1
pS
)dαM (40)
Using 38, the inflation constraint – keeping wA unchanged - implies that
dM + dS =
αA
wA
d(C +G) (41)
Combining these equations (40)-(41), we have
−(C +G)( 1
pM
− 1
pS
)dαM = (
αM
pM
+
αS
pS
+
αA
wA
)d(C +G) (42)
A positive shock to Z is met by a rise in interest rates, the exchange rate appre-
ciates and αM increases. Equation (42) implies that this must be accompanied
by a rise in (C+G). If both αM and (C+G) increase, then M must also increase
(see equation (36)) while M + S must fall (see equation (41)). Hence, S must
fall.
Intuitively, as the exchange rate appreciates, consumption shifts towards M
goods (because α′M = −α′S < 0). This shift reduces total labor demand in the
formal sectors (because pM > pS and qM = qS), and an increase in total con-
sumption is needed to keep informal sector incomes constant. But the increase
in consumption cannot fully offset the effect of the fall in αS on the demand for
S goods; if it did, we would have had a rise in formal sector employment, and
the average income in the informal sector would have increased.
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Appendix E: Imports of intermediate goods
If both the markup and labor productivity are constant (with labor productivity
still normalized at 1) we have
pM = (1 +mM )(wM + γMpMη) = pM (η); p
′
M ≥ 0
pS = (1−mS)(wS + γSpMη) = pS(η); p′S ≥ 0
piM =
mM
1 +mM
1
1− γMη ; pi
′
M ≥ 0
piS =
mS
1 +mS
1
1− γSη pMpS
; pi′S ≥ 0
The equilibrium conditions in equations (11)-(13) still hold, but the expres-
sion for (C +G) in equation (14) becomes modified. It now reads
C +G =
pM [(1− piMs)(1− γMη)(I +X) + ηZ]
θ + αM [spiM + γMη(1− spiM )] + αS [spiS + γS pMpS η(1− spiS)]
(43)
The wage in the tradable sector is predetermined, and an unchanged wage
ratio requires that wA not change. We have
wA =
1
N −M − SαA(C +G)
and an unchanged wA implies that
−d(M + S) = αAd(C +G) (44)
Using (11)-(12) we have
d(pSS) = αSd(C +G) (45)
d(pMM) =
αM
αS
d(pSS) + d(pMI) + d(pMX) (46)
Case 1: Constant prices If the prices are constant, an increase in interest
rates and the associated appreciation of the exchange rate will reduce the cost of
intermediate inputs and raise the profit shares. The increase in profit share, in
turn, will have a negative impact on aggregate consumption (C +G); equation
(43) implies that ∂(C +G)/∂pii < 0.
Monetary policy now has a more powerful effect on aggregate demand, but
a commodity boom still raises S and reduces M . The proof can proceed as in
in Appendix C. If the change in S were negative then, using (46), M would also
fall, and (44) cannot hold. Thus, S and thereby C+G must increase. Equation
(44) now implies that this increase must be combined with a reduction in M .
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Case 2: Constant markups If markups are kept constant, both prices and
profit shares become increasing functions of the real exchange rate. Depending
on how relative prices respond to exchange rate shocks, this opens the possibility
for results other than a fall in M and an increase in S.
If d pSpM /dη ≥ 0, we must have an increase in S, but M need not fall. The
proof of a rise in S again follows the same recipe. If dS ≤ 0, we must have
d(pSS) < 0, d(C +G) < 0 and d(
pS
pM
S) < 0. Hence,
dM =
αM
αS
d(
pS
pM
S) + dI + dX < 0
It follows that equation (44) cannot be satisfied if dS ≤ 0.
To see that M need not fall, note that with exogenous values of both in-
vestment and exports (dI = dX = 0) and d pSpM /dη = 0, equation (46) reduces
to
dM =
αM
αS
dS
Thus, M and S must move in the same direction, and since prices fall, they
must both increase in order to satisfy equation (44). Intuitively, the average
informal sector income wAis determined by the number of workers and the
nominal demand. Thus, if nominal demand fall, a reduction in the number of
workers in the informal sector is needed in order to keep the average income
unchanged.
If d pSpM /dη < 0, the results can be different. Again, consider the simple case
with dI = dX = 0. Now, if d pSpM /dη < 0, we have
dM =
αM
αS
d(
pS
pM
S) =
αM
αS
Sd(
pS
pM
) +
αM
αS
pS
pM
dS >
αM
αS
pS
pM
dS
Using (44), the changes in M and S cannot both be negative. Thus, we must
have dM > 0; depending on the parameters and the magnitude of the decline
in pS , the change in the output of nontradables can go either way.
Appendix F: Imported and nontradable invest-
ment goods
Imported investment goods Assume the extreme case in which all I is
imported. In this case:
pMM = αM (C +G) + pMX
NX = pMX(η)− θ(C +G)− ηpMI + pMηZ
The equilibrium conditions for the A and S sectors (equations (12)-(13)) are
unchanged. For the M -sector, however, equilibrium now requires that
M =
αM [(1− piMs)X + ηZ]
θ + s(αSpiS + αMpiM )
+X
41
Proceeding analogously to appendix B, the short run effects (without infla-
tion targeting) are qualitatively the same as before. They will also be quanti-
tatively the same in the particular case that both profit share and the capital
accumulation are predetermined; in other cases, they will be weaker.
Considering the impact of the inflation targeting policy, we now have
C +G =
pM [(1− piMs)X + ηZ]
θ + s(αSpiS + αMpiM )
The demand for investment goods no longer generates domestic income, but
C +G still depends positively on M,S,Z and η (and thereby negatively on r).
Thus, the analysis can proceed as in Appendix C, and the qualitative results
are unchanged.
Nontradable investment goods If investment goods are domestically pro-
duced but nontradable, we have
pMM = αM (C +G) + pMX
pSS = αS(C +G) + pSI
Aggregate consumption and the no-inflation condition can be written
C +G =
(1− piSs)pSI + (1− piMs)pMX + ηZ}
θ + αSpiSs+ αMpiMs
wM
µ
= wA =
αA
N −M − S
(1− piSs)pSI + pM [(1− piMs)X + ηZ]
θ + αSpiSs+ αMpiMs
The relative impact of a commodity boom on S and M under inflation
targeting now becomes ambiguous. If I is insensitive to changes in r while X
is sensitive to changes in η, the qualitative results will be as in Appendix C.
If these assumptions are reversed and I is sensitive to changes in r while X is
insensitive to changes in η, the results in Appendix C may also be reversed:
inflation targeting may produce an equilibrium with a higher M and a lower S.
We show these results by considering the two extreme cases, one with I
independent of r and one with X exogenous (independent of η).
If I is independent of r, changes in the interest rate have no direct effect
on the demand for domestically produced goods, and inflation targeting works
entirely through the effects of the interest rate in the real exchange rate; the
analysis of this case is completely analogous to the case with imported invest-
ment goods.
If X is independent of η, we can follow the steps in Appendix C. Assume
that dZ > 0, dr > 0, dη < 0, dX = 0, dM = d(C+G) = 0. To keep wA constant,
we now would need to have dS = 0 in order to keep N −M − S unchanged.
The change in S, however, is given by dS = αSpS d(C + G) + dI = dI. Since we
know that r has risen, dI = IMdM + ISdS + Irdr < ISdS. It now follows that
(1− IS)dS < 0 and we have reached a contradiction; if r is raised sufficiently to
make M unchanged, then the nontradable sector must contract, and the result
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would be a decline in informal sector wages. Thus, the new equilibrium must
involve a smaller rise in r which means that the output of the tradable formal
sector must expand. The decline in S follows from the observation that an
increase in M (and thereby in C + G) must be matched by a fall in M + S to
prevent an increase in the average income in the informal sector.
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